NATO without France

Abstract

While the Atlantic alliance has tried to implement a strategy of graduated deterrence and flexible response, France has worked toward a gradual disentanglement from the military structure of nato. The process of separation, which started in 1959 with France's withdrawal from the Mediterranean command, came to a rapid climax in 1966 with General de Gaulle's irrevocable decision to pull all French forces out of the integrated command structure of the alliance by July 1 of that year. The military effects of this move have been felt more immediately and can be ascertained somewhat more clearly than the longrange political implication. NATO without France1 is a very timely, readable, and highly competent discussion of these military consequences, and, within the somewhat restricted scope which he has set for himself, the author does full justice to this sensitive subject. As the result of the French withdrawal and the expulsion of allied forces and bases from French territory, nato has lost not only the direct territorial link between its central and southern sectors of operation but also a vital portion of its hinterland which had provided allied forces with manoeuvrability, air bases, supply lines, and communication installations. For an alliance which has been plagued by lack of space and which has suffered from a shortage of conventionally armed forces, this presents a rather grim picture. Perhaps there are a few compensating factors. Two French divisions remain in Germany, although under strictly French rather than under nato command. This might facilitate some degree of co-operation with the military apparatus of the alliance. But the primary role of these forces is political rather than military, for their presence places Germany in a position of dependence vis-a-vis France a situation which the integrated defence structure was designed to prevent or ameliorate and creates a semblance of parity with the Soviet Union which maintains its forces in East Germany also under strictly national command. The supply lines and air bases are being relocated to a more forward area, even though this entails considerable costs and makes them more vulnerable to attack. The development of a nato satellite communications system makes the alliance less dependent on French communication lines. More important, France continues to grant overflight privileges to allied aircraft and still participates in nato's forward air defence warning system. The latter, to be sure, is dictated less by French concern about allied goodwill than by a very real need to provide her vulnerable force de frappe with advance warning.