NATO Before and After the Second Gulf War

Abstract

For an assessment of the possible roles NATO may have in the future, and their possible implications for international security, it would be useful to look back in order to make a meaningful assessment of where NATO was before the second Gulf War, and where it is heading toward in its aftermath. It would not be inaccurate to argue that NATO came about as the product of the strategic vision of the United States for the post-World War II era. Anticipating that the war would come to a close with the victory of the Allied powers, whereby the Soviet Union would occupy a significant portion of continental Europe, the United States wanted to initiate the necessary institutional frameworks that would enable it to maintain a foothold in Western Europe. As such, it was believed that the U.S. would achieve a “forward defense” capability against its primary antagonist, namely the Soviet Union, on the eve of the nuclear age. Hence, the estate value of Western Europe, neighboring the Soviet Union as well as its zone of influence, was extremely precious to the United States. Having the capability to strike the heartland of the Soviet Union from this near location, if need be, while keeping the continental U.S. still far from the reach of most Soviet military capabilities, was made possible thanks to the existence of the NATO alliance. The “delicate balance of terror” that was eventually achieved due to the mutual “second-strike capabilities” of both the U.S. and the Soviet Union ensured that a certain degree of stability could be maintained during the Cold War period. With the collapse of the bipolar system and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, we must admit that continental Europe has lost its vitally significant strategic value for the U.S. NATO, which was the institutional framework born out of such a role, needed new roles to justify its existence after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the demise of the Soviet Union. That role was soon to be assumed by the Alliance as a result of the atrocities in the Balkans. The modalities of this new role, however, have come about as a result of painstaking deliberations between the Europeans and the Americans. At a time when an integrated Europe was poised to assert itself as a major power in world politics, Europe’s continued dependence on the military capabilities of the U.S. was still a necessity for the aspiring European states, with Germany and France at the forefront. Those in Europe who wanted to undermine the role of NATO in the European security and defense structures, or even to abolish it, failed first in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and then in Kosovo. The nature of disagreement at that point was more political, rather than legal or otherwise. At that time, there was not a serious debate on the legitimacy of NATO’s (and thus the United States’) military interventions in southeastern Europe. Both the Europeans as well as the Americans have agreed that, even though these were