NATO and the “Special Relationship”

Abstract

The Anglo-American “special relationship” has long been the subject of memoirs, press commentary, and scholarly analysis. Judgments have varied about both its nature and its importance. Supporters of the special relationship believe that it was one of the keys to Western success in winning the Cold War, providing the foundation on which the Atlantic Alliance was built and maintained. Yet the special relationship has also had its detractors: President Charles de Gaulle resented the Anglo-Saxon domination of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and withdrew French forces from the integrated military command structure partly as a protest against the close relationship between London and Washington; proponents of greater European defense cooperation have regarded the special relationship as a major obstacle; and critics on the British left have seen the special relationship as little more than British dependence on the United States. Moreover, there have been occasions—the Suez crisis; the lack of British support for the United States in Vietnam; Margaret Thatcher’s failure to persuade the United States to purchase the British battlefield communication system, Ptarmigan, rather than its French competitor, RITA; and the Clinton administration’s decision to allow Gerry Adams into the United States—when the special relationship seemed anything but “special.” Yet, in each case the damage was temporary.