Nativism and Neurobiology: Representations, Representing, and the Continuum of Cognition

Abstract

Whether or not the mind contains innately specified representations is highly contestable, especially in light of neurobiological evidence for the plasticity of the brain. In what follows, I provide an overview of the debate as it now stands and a discussion of the possibility, proposed by Clark (1998) and others, that representations need not be localized and are better understood as distributed systems. I then seek to tie the debate into a similar controversy surrounding the architecture of the mind. While advocates of modularity find arguments for innately specified and domain-specific representations palatable, as the thesis of innateness only strengthens their claims, favorers of a more domain-general learning mechanism are not convinced by arguments for innate specificity and instead insist that representations emerge or are learned. Rather than come down on one side of these issues, I propose, in the spirit of Cundall (2006), that cognition is more aptly conceived of as a continuum: the domains by which certain “representers” are constrained turn out to be innate, while many of the complex representations, in particular, higher-level social–cognitive representations, come from more general learning and development. Thus, the problem of reconciling nativism and neurobiology turns out to be a matter not of choosing one of two extremes, but instead, adopting an intermediary view.