Abstract

Right-wing populists across many western countries have markedly intensified their references to Christianity in recent years. However, Christian communities’ reactions to such developments often vary significantly, ranging from disproportionate support in some countries to outspoken opposition in others. This paper explores the role of structural factors, and in particular of Church–State relations, in accounting for some of these differences. Specifically, this article explores how Church–State relations in Germany and the United States have produced different incentives and opportunity structures for faith leaders when facing right-wing populism. Based on quantitative studies, survey data, and 31 in-depth elite interviews, this research suggests that whereas Germany’s system of “benevolent neutrality” encourages highly centralised churches whose leaders perceive themselves as integral part and defenders of the current system, and are therefore both willing and able to create social taboos against right-wing populism, America’s “Wall of separation” favours a de-centralised religious marketplace, in which church leaders are more prone to agree with populists’ anti-elitist rhetoric, and face higher costs and barriers against publicly condemning right-wing populism. Taking such structural factors into greater account when analysing Christian responses to right-wing populism is central to understanding current and future dynamics between politics and religion in western democracies.

Highlights

  • The first key dynamic observed in this context was that even though both German and US faith leaders largely disagreed with right-wing populists’ nativist and anti-immigrationist policies, American faith leaders saw Trumpism as a potential ally against what they perceived as an increasingly anti-religious re-interpretation of the First Amendment by the mainstream political establishment in recent years, whereas German faith leaders saw themselves as beneficiaries and defenders of the status quo against the populist revolt

  • That even though different settlements of Church–State relations may be designed with similar intentions—that is in the German and US cases with the aim to strengthen religion as a pillar of liberal democracy—they often exercise opposing incentives and pressure structures on Christian communities as they confront right-wing populist movements

  • That the effects of these different and pressure structures are often most directly felt by faith leaders, whose response to right-wing populism in Germany and the US appeared importantly influenced by the institutional settlement of Church–State relations

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Summary

Introduction

Publisher’s Note: MDPI stays neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Some authors have stressed the importance of political party affiliation, which may make many European Christian communities unavailable towards the populist right as they are already bound to Christian democratic or conservative competitor parties, whereas in the US traditional party allegiance to the GOP might have pushed American Christians towards Donald Trump (Arzheimer and Carter 2009; Montgomery and Winter 2015; Siegers and Jedinger 2020). Each of these avenues of research contributes critical insights. The conclusion (Section 5) places these findings in the context of the academic literature and discusses their implication for current debates about the relationship between religion and politics in contemporary western societies

Background
The German Grundgesetz and the System of Benevolent Neutrality
The US Constitution’s First Amendment
How Church–State Relations Affect Elite Responses to Right-Wing Populism
Faith Leaders Self-Perception in the System
Access to the Policymaking Process
Church Internal Power Dynamics
Direct and Indirect Influences of Church–State Relations on Christian
Findings
Conclusions
Full Text
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