Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State by Mark R. s> Beissinger (review)

Abstract

REVIEWS 78I Beissinger, Mark R. Nationalist Mobilization andtheCollapse of theSovietState. CambridgeStudiesin ComparativePolitics.CambridgeUniversityPress, Cambridge and New York, 2002. xv + 503 pp. Illustrations. Tables. Notes. Appendices. Index. ?6o.oo; ?2 I.95. INthisvolume ProfessorBeissingeremploysa numberof diversemethodological structuresand tools throughthe employment of which he seeksto account for the demise of the Soviet Union in i99i. Proceeding from an initial constructionistperspective,he employs 'event analysis'to the process of state reconstructionand collapse between I985 and I99 I. In reservestandsa host of tablesandstatistics,supplementedbyregressionanalysisandtheapplication of coefficients.These then arethe toolswithwhich the Soviet Union's collapse is dissected. Throughout the book, Professor Beissinger demonstrates that he has knowledge of the subject that is as deep as it is broad. He also displays a similar degree of acquaintance with the wider literature on nationalism. In addition he makes use of a comprehensive and diverse range of English and Russianlanguage resources. So far, so good. There are, however, two issuesthat need to be addressed. The first, and less important, concerns the structure of the book itself. At times, this reviewer felt as if he were reading a doctoral thesis, and not a commerciallyproduced volume. On occasion, ProfessorBeissingeris at such pains to describethe nature and advantagesof his methodological approach, that the main purpose of the volume, i.e. to account for the collapse of the Soviet Union, becomes submergedbeneath a sub-texton methodology. Secondly, and more importantly, he claims that he is seeking to offer a correctiveto accounts of the Soviet Union's demise thatlean too heavilyupon explanations that focus upon the machinations of elements of the Soviet political elite and the wider nomenclatura. Despite the welter of assembled facts and the internal coherence of his argument, this reviewer remains unconvinced of the validityof the centralhypothesis. The case as presented seems to be on the lines that Mikhail Gorbachev inadvertently unleashed a range of forces that, due to the fundamental illegitimacy of the Soviet regime, became subsumed within nationalist demands for self-determination and independence. This is pretty standard fare, to which only the most antediluvian of Marxist scholars would object. However, it is an entirelydifferentmatterto argue, as he does here, that huge sections of the then Soviet political elite came positively to accept and even embrace national self-determination and the establishment of liberal democracy. First,if we were to examine the political regimes acrossthe territoryof the former Soviet Union, we would find that much of it continues to be ruled by elements of the formerpolitical 6lite and nomenclatura.This in itselfisprima facieevidence that somethingotherthan a revolutionhasoccurred.Next, ifwe were to examine the natureof governance in most of the post-Soviet states,we would findveryfew examples of fullyfunctionalliberaldemocracy.The Baltic states and possibly Russia are the exceptions that prove the rule. Instead, we findeitheroverwhelmingevidence of statecollapse, most notablyin Armenia, 782 SEER, 8o, 4, 2002 Georgia and Moldova, or a uniquepost-Soviethybridof cronycapitalismand creepingdictatorship.Inboth cases,theformerpoliticaleliteretainssignificant power, and seeksto socialize a younger generation of acolytes and neophytes into itsways. To put it anotherway, ifwe wish to examine how the Soviet Union came to collapse, we need to pay attention to how elements of its formerpolitical elite both anticipated and precipitated that fragmentation.We also then need to examine how such individualsdeliberately stoked the flames of nationalism, and how they created a set of circumstances that facilitated their grip on power in the post-Soviet environment. These are weighty reservations.Such uncertaintiesdo not mean that the volume is without merit. On the contrary, as was indicated earlier in the review, there is much that deserves commendation. Yet, for all the dazzling methodological footwork,the author failsto convince. Forexample, on page 417, formerUkrainianpresidentLeonid Kravchukis quoted as having saidin I990, that a sovereign Ukraine should have the right to pursue its own space programme. Given the stateof Ukraine in 2002, it is difficultto knowwhether or not to laugh or cry at such a statement. On the other hand, perhaps Kravchukwas demonstratinghis knowledgeof the fact that symbolsof virility areofimportanceto nation-builders.A deeperinvestigationof suchapparently innocent statements on the part of Professor Beissinger would have been appreciated. Department ofPoliticsandInternational Relations K. CORDELL University ofPlymouth Honneland, Geir, and Blakkisrud,Helge (eds). Centre-Periphey Relationsin Russia. T7heCase of the Northwestern Regions.Ashgate, Aldershot and...