Abstract

ABSTRACTIt is broadly acknowledged that the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is an important engine of European integration. Although this role of the Court is well documented and analysed, there still is little research about the domestic effects of CJEU activism. This article contributes to the emerging literature on Europeanization through case law by analysing national responses to the CJEU adjudication on so called Golden Shares, a jurisdiction that limited member states’ influence on privatized companies. It is argued that the domestic reactions to these CJEU decisions were decisively conditioned by the presence of protective fallback options for the member states – and not by mobilization pressure or legal uncertainty costs, the two most important determinants of national responses to CJEU case law that have been identified so far in the literature.

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