Abstract
A formal dyadic model of the arms acquisition process is developed and analyzed through computer simulation. A rational model produces behavior consistent with a powerful security dilemma. A spiral model, in which images of the opponent become more aggressive, sparking an arms race, emerges from the simulation for deterrent nations. In addition to these anticipated findings, the rational arms model suggests that competitive factors have their greatest impact for rivals near parity; noncompetitive forces may drive the decision for unbalanced dyads. Also unpredicted from previous formal work, only one member of a competitive dyad needs to favor disarmanent for both nations to disarm.
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