Abstract

The Treaty of Lisbon’s institutional modifications narrowed the options for member states within the formal decision-making rules, mainly due to the broadening of the ordinary legislative procedure. This paper hypothesises that the actors in EU institutions seek to strengthen their influence through coordination across the EU legislative institutions, along either national or political party lines. The research data consist of co-decision files that include information on the national and political identities of all the relevant actors in the legislative process in 2004–2011. Statistical tests assess the likelihood of changes in the dynamics of the legislative process as related to the affiliation of the actors after Lisbon. The results show a clear difference in the post-Lisbon legislative process, indicating that the political party identity of the actors may play a more significant role, although other factors must be considered as well.

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