Abstract
After the dismal failure of Operation Parakram, India went back to the drawing board and developed a new limited war strategy, referred to as the Cold Start Doctrine, with the aim of quick mobilization of their troops to Pakistan's border, from where they could launch conventional strikes against Pakistan and at the same time not escalate the conflict to full scale or to the nuclear level. In response to India's Cold Start Doctrine, Pakistan introduced tactical nuclear weapons. To understand why Pakistan developed the tactical nuclear weapons we must try to understand their strategic culture. The paper will argue that the Cold Start Doctrine is in fact real and can be materialized, and for that reason Pakistan has had to respond to the threat it poses. In this paper we will try to understand Pakistan's response to the Cold Start Doctrine by trying to grasp its strategic culture.
Highlights
[After the dismal failure of Operation Parakram, India went back to the drawing board and developed a new limited war strategy, referred to as the Cold Start Doctrine, with the aim of quick mobilization of their troops to Pakistan’s border, from where they could launch conventional strikes against Pakistan and at the same time not escalate the conflict to full scale or to the nuclear level
The paper will argue that the Cold Start Doctrine is real and can be materialized, and for that reason Pakistan has had to respond to the threat it poses
Gen. (r) Khalid Kidwai, the former head of Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division (SPD) said that there was a general realization within the security establishment that India felt there was space for conventional war under the nuclear umbrella as proven by Operation Parakram in 2001, and there was a fear that the Indians could engage Pakistan in a cold start type of limited war knowing that Pakistan would not use its strategic nuclear weapons to respond to a conflict at the battlefield level
Summary
Abstract [After the dismal failure of Operation Parakram, India went back to the drawing board and developed a new limited war strategy, referred to as the Cold Start Doctrine, with the aim of quick mobilization of their troops to Pakistan’s border, from where they could launch conventional strikes against Pakistan and at the same time not escalate the conflict to full scale or to the nuclear level. In introducing Nasr, Pakistan has made sure that if deterrence fails and India launches a cold start style military operation Pakistan can limit the damage of war by using their tactical nuclear weapons rather than their strategic weapons. Operation Parakram was a failure because by the time the Indians mobilized their troops to the border, Pakistan had already taken up their defensive positions, so India could not initiate a limited war without risking escalation Both countries walked away with different lessons. The Indians learned that they needed to reformulate their conventional military doctrine vis-à-vis Pakistan after Operation Parakram, which meant quicker mobilization of forces to the border for quick and limited military action against Pakistan without risking escalation to the nuclear level
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