Abstract
In this paper we study the problem of the Nash implementation in private good economies when preferences are single-dipped by allowing multiple best indifferent elements. We give a full characterization in this domain by showing that a social choice correspondence (SCC) is Nash implementable if and only if satisfies Maskin monotonicity. To support this result, we give examples of some well-known SCCs that satisfying or not satisfying Maskin's proprieties.
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