Nash equilibrium strategy in the deregulated power industry and comparing its lost welfare with Iran wholesale electricity market

Abstract

With the increasing use of different types of auctions in market designing, modeling of participants’ behaviors to evaluate the market structure is one of the main discussions in the studies related to the deregulated power industries. In this article, we apply an approach of the optimal bidding behavior to the Iran wholesale electricity market as a restructured electric power industry and model how the participants of the market bid in the spot electricity market. The problem is formulated analytically using the Nash equilibrium concept composed of large numbers of players having discrete and very large strategy spaces. Then, we compute and draw supply curve of the competitive market in which all generators’ proposed prices are equal to their marginal costs and supply curve of the real market in which the pricing mechanism is pay-as-bid. We finally calculate the lost welfare or inefficiency of the Nash equilibrium and the real market by comparing their supply curves with the competitive curve. We examine 3 cases on November 24 (2 cases) and July 24 (1 case), 2012. It is observed that in the Nash equilibrium on November 24 and demand of 23,487 MW, there are 212 allowed plants for the first case (plants are allowed to choose any quantity of generation except one of them that should be equal to maximum Power) and the economic efficiency or social welfare of Nash equilibrium is 2.77 times as much as the real market. In addition, there are 184 allowed plants for the second case (plants should offer their maximum power with different prices) and the efficiency or social welfare of Nash equilibrium is 3.6 times as much as the real market. On July 24 and demand of 42,421 MW, all 370 plants should generate maximum energy due to the high electricity demand that the economic efficiency or social welfare of the Nash equilibrium is about 2 times as much as the real market.