Abstract
We show, by employing a density result for probability measures, that in games with a finite number of players and ∞-dimensional pure strategy spaces Nash equilibria can be approximated by finite mixed strategies. Given e>0, each player receives an expected utility payoff e/2 close to his Nash payoff and no player could change his strategy unilaterally and do better than e.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
