Abstract
In this paper, a competitive coevolutionary approach is used to find out the Nash–Cournot equilibrium of an oligopolistic electricity market based on either centralized or bilateral structure, where the transmission constraints are considered. We consider a market game played by bounded evolutionary agents, adapting their strategies to maximize their profits in a competitive environment. Under the effect of the competition, the coevolved agents are led toward an equilibrium point where each agent population is invaded by an Evolutionary stable Strategy.
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