Narco Robin Hoods: Community support for illicit economies and violence in rural Central America

Abstract

• Traffickers are more likely to garner community support when they are native to the community. • Traffickers are more likely to garner community support when they operate in rural and marginalized areas. • Community support for illicit economies can limit narco-violence and reduce non-trafficking related crimes. • Narcos invest in spaces the state has abandoned and, in return, locals provide support networks for clandestine operations. Current counter-narcotics policies are counter-productive and have contributed to the ability of narcos to gain local support. While there is a growing literature on criminal governance, to date limited work has focused on rural spaces and transit zones. Drawing on over two years of ethnographic fieldwork in drug trafficking hubs along the Caribbean coast of Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Honduras, I provide evidence and offer an initial theorization of forms of criminal governance in rural Central America. I show how both structural and individual level factors increase community support for illicit economies. I argue that rural and marginalized communities where there is widespread corruption and limited state capacity are more inclined to be supportive of and form collaborative relationships with traffickers. I argue that traffickers who are native to the community, limit their use of violence in the community, and invest economically in the community are the most likely to win the community’s support or even become viewed as Robin Hood-esque figures. In spaces where community support is low, I find traffickers may still take actions to limit crimes unrelated to their business (e.g. theft) which could draw attention from state actors and result in community frustration. Understanding community-narco dynamics is crucial to formulating effective policies to address violence in the region. Current international counter-narcotics policies are counter-productive; therefore, it should be unsurprising that certain marginalized communities support drug-traffickers who offer tangible benefits instead of counter-narcotics forces who seem to increase conflict and suppress economic activity without providing viable alternatives.