基于博弈的域间路由协同监测激励策略

Abstract

The cooperative monitoring, which supports incremental deployment and does not modify the BGP protocol, is one of the best ways to improve the security of the BGP-based inter-domain routing system. However, the behavior of its participants is autonomous and changeable for getting much more profit, which makes the cooperative network work in low efficiency. In this paper, the above problem is depicted as a noncooperative game, and based on the Game Theory, GTIS, an incentive strategy for the inter-domain routing cooperative monitoring, is proposed. In GTIS, the reputation status is used to describe the performance of a node in the cooperative network. It encourages nodes to choose positive and honest behavior strategies for greater and long-term benefits. At the same time, a “humane” punishment mechanism is developed to curb speculation nodes. If a node departs from the normal many times in its life period, it will be punished superimposed. By this way, the “first offender” nodes and the “recidivist” nodes can be effectively distinguished. Theoretical analysis and simulation results show that with the GTIS strategy, cooperative nodes turn to be positive and honest when exchanging routing information, so that the success rate of information exchange between nodes becomes higher.