建設組合方式における業務委託に関する制度について

Abstract

Previous study has proved that a targeted removal approach for fire spreading buildings is effective in preventing wide-spread fire generated by an intense earthquake in areas densely crowded with wooden buildings, and that a building cooperative system can effectively function for the purpose of consolidating small and irregular plots of land without road access and meeting the financial requirement of landowners. A separate issue is how to design a mechanism that allows agents for cooperatives to work autonomously. The principal-agent theory provides a substantial framework for the issue, such as asymmetric information, risk, conflicts of interests, moral hazards, observability, and incentives. According to the theory, we make a realistic model of agent behavior that reduces project risks for building cooperatives by acquired information. The model analyses quantitative effects on agent effort levels by factors, i.e. allowance of dual employment, observability, and terms of payment. Analysis indicates unexpected synergistic effects. Although one factor alone has little influence on the agent effort level, multiple factors significantly lower the effort level. This suggests that regulations on agencies should require that operating contracts prohibit subsidiary work, deliverables, and payments by results other than by banning conflicts of interests. other than avoiding conflict of interest if agents are not well disciplined as professionals. This quantitative analysis on a realistic contract theory model could be an example to consider for an effective regulation structure that contains synergistic effects.