政権に使われる民兵

Abstract

Recent internal conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa have witnessed governments employing militias to complement and enhance existing national armies, or as alternative forces altogether. Use of militias in counter-insurgency operations has brought about tremendous human casualties and material damages. The paper attempts to elucidate the meaning of this particular type of violence from an empirical as well as theoretical point of view. Through four case studies of militias in Congo (Brazzaville), Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Sudan as well as through examination of the notion of militias within an African political context, it becomes evident that African militias are generally not regulated by formal law, and tend to be formed and supported from political leaders above. In conclusion, the paper also draws relationships between the militia phenomenon and the nature of post-colonial African states, which have assumed strong patrimonial characteristics. In recent conflicts, African political leaders have often preferred militias to weak national armies that have been personalized through long-term patrimonial rules.