イギリス植民地銀行の対銀価下落政策

Abstract

In the last quarter of the 19th century, the history of eastern banking was dominated by the depreciation of silver in terms of gold. The continuous decline in the value of silver was a problem for all eastern exchange banks. The Oriental Bank, which was the largest bank in Asia, fell into a business crisis and stopped payment in 1884. Under these circumstances, the Hongkong Bank extended their business, made remunerative profits and became the largest bank in Asia. How could the Hongkong Bank get over the difficulties produced by the exchange fluctuation, and grow up in such bad times? The Hongkong Bank's activities in this era were marked by the Even Keel Policy. One purpose of this article attempts to examine what the Even Keel Policy was through contemporary evidence. Even though the Hongkong Bank adopted the Even Keel Policy, the Bank could not overcome all difficulties. The Bank suffered considerable losses on the exchange business in 1886. The other purpose of this article is to try to investigate why the Bank suffered heavy losses in 1886. The foreign exchange banks had to lay in fund largely at Hankow as preparation for the Chinese tea season. They had remitted a very large amount of their funds to Hankow in Shansi bankers' drafts since 1875. But this mode of remittance was stopped by the Shanghai financial crisis of 1883. Therefore, the Hongkong Bank had to send their fund in the form of “Sycee” to Hankow. In the spring of 1886, the silver panic happened suddenly, when the Hongkong Bank remitted large “Sycee” to Hankow. As a result, the Hongkong Bank could not avoid suffering heavy losses from the silver panic of 1886.