Abstract

Wittgensteinʼs so-called “private language argument” denies the normativity of private definitions, and suggests that sensation words are taught through replacing primitive behaviour expressive of sensations. However, these observations fail to provide a full understanding of mental concepts of our ordinary language. In this article, the relevance of the concept of secondary sense is brought to the fore through examining the concept of particular feelings inherent in various experiences and also that of calculation in the head. It is shown that natural linguistic reactions present in the use of words in the secondary sense are essential in gaining an overview of our ordinary language.

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