Abstract
In this critical notice, I point out that there are two problems for Ishiguro's interpretations of Leibniz. First, I argue that her response to Benson Mates in the defense of her interpretation of the principle of substitutivity sal va veritate as providing a criterion for the identity of concepts is not successful. Secondly, I explain why I cannot agree with her interpretation that Leibniz does not mean to eliminate relational properties in his reconstruals of relational propositions by showing that Leibniz's denial of the existence of extrinsic denominations, which he infers from the predicate-in-subject principle, is not consistent with the interpretation.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callSimilar Papers
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
