Abstract
The doctrine of manoeuvre has been emoployed by military academics in the West for centuries and it has been embraced as flawless, particularly after the victory in the Gulf War. Lieutenant Brigaddier Robert Fry here questions the credentials of the Manoeuvre Warfare School. He uses both current and historical examples to illustrate how tactical victory did not always achieve its goals, for example, the legacy of the oft‐quoted battle of Cannae and more recently the failure of Western involvement in the Gulf War to achieve the strategic objective of neutralizing the Iraqi regime. In both the American and the British experiences, there is little historical evidence of a talent for manoeuvre. The historical record of war on both sides of the Atlantic has been of wars of mass involvement rather than of elite manoeuvre.
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