Abstract

This article examines seven myths about the Central Intelligence Agency. These misperceptions persist because of an inadequate understanding of the relationship between intelligence and policy, outdated stereotypes that ignore recent reforms, and the politics that accompany delivering bad news to senior officials. Scholars and intelligence officers looking to advance the debate on intelligence issues could usefully focus their research on several core dynamics: sharpening the distinction between intelligence failures and policy failures; deconstructing intelligence successes to determine whether those ‘best practices’ can be replicated elsewhere; and monitoring the risks when an apolitical intelligence agency closely interacts with the policy community. The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Government. The authors thank Dr. Michael O'Hanlon and Dr. Jennifer Kibbe of the Brookings Institution for comments on an earlier draft.

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