Mydral's Assumptions on Race Relations: A Conceptual Commentary

Abstract

Myrdal's thesis with regard to relations in American society is examined conceptually to bring out its underlying normative assumptions concerning nature of social integration and of social change. An alternate interpretation of relations in American society is offered, based upon assumptions that are more structural and less normative in character. PARTICULARLY since 1954, almost all attempts to treat members of minorities according to universalistic standards of citizenship have met with a storm of opposition in southern states. While this opposition was not unexpected or unforeseen, prognosis for relations and for culture change more generally in South depends largely upon meaning ascribed to it. This paper comments on a view, advanced most cogently by Gunnar Myrdal in 19441, that opposition has its source in a value with respect to relations, in American society. Myrdal's thesis has become so well institutionalized among sociologists that its assumptions have never been systematically examined, to my knowledge. Attention rather has been centered on issues of methodology raised chiefly by Myrdal's repudiation of disinterested social science2 or on issues of substance lending themselves to statistical test: notably hypothesis of a differential rank order of discrimination between whites and nonwhites3; and hypothesis of discomfort in practice of racial segregation4. By contrast, this paper attempts a conceptual rather than empirical analysis of Myrdal hypothesis. first part examines assumptions which underlie Myrdal's concept of American culture as a dilemma with respect to relations. second examines assumptions of his dynamic analysis, and suggests an alternate way to interpret dynamics of relations in American society, given assumptions concerning social integration and social process different from those which he employed. AMERICAN CULTURE AS DILEMMA In making a comprehensive study of Negro in America, it was perhaps inevitable that Myrdal should have been struck by existence in American society of two irreconcilable sets of values, in respect to race and race relations. One set emphasized inherent equality of individuals in terms of their origins, and moral desirability of minimizing race as criterion for avoidance-acceptance relations. other set emphasized inherent superiority of one group over another, and moral desirability of maximizing race as criterion for avoidance-acceptance relations. Myrdal conceptualized relationship between these two sets of values in terms of generality-specificity. To first set, he ascribed authority of what he called American Creed, saying that it operated on the general plane ... where American thinks, talks, and acts under influence of high national and Christian pre* writer is indebted to Professor Samuel DuB. Cook, Atlanta University, and to Professor David Riesman, Harvard University, for helpful comments and suggestions. They are in no sense responsible, however, for views expressed here. I Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma (New York: Harper Bros. 1944), 2 vols. 2 See for example, G. Nettler, A Note on Myrdal's 'Notes onFacts and Valuations' ' , American Sociological Review, 9 (1944) pp. 686-8; C. C. Bowman, Polarities and Impairment of Science, American Sociological Review, 15 (1950) p. 482. 3 For example, L. M. Killian and C. M. Grigg, Orders of Discrimination of Negroes and Whites in a Southern City, Social Forces, 39 (March 1961), pp. 235-9; E. E. Edmunds, The Myrdalian Thesis: Rank Order of Discrimination, Phylon, 15 (1954), pp. 297-303. 4 See E. Q. Campbell, Moral Discomfort and Racial Segregation-An Examination of Myrdal Hypothesis, Social Forces 39 (March 1961), pp. 228-