Abstract
The research on redistributive strategies to secure support has been dominated by a core and swing voter model, which pits two parties against each other in a costly race for support. What are other options beyond targeting either swing or one’s own core voters? This paper identifies a political scenario where core supporters from other parties are viable targets and sets out to test three dimensions that indicate when actors can effectively target them. This paper’s main expectation is that by accounting for voters’ ideological affinity, levels of fragmentation, and the potential to deliver their votes, parties can effectively target other parties’ core supporters. The case of Brazil’s Bolsa Família delivers evidence for the hypotheses.
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