Abstract

This paper studies a model of a two-armed bandit played in parallel by two or more players. Players observe the actions of all other players, but not the outcome of their experiments. It is shown that if the parameters of the two arms (i.e., their success probabilities) are different by a fixed margin, all players eventually settle on the same arm with probability one inanyNash equilibrium of the game.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, D82.

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