Abstract
For a sample of global and international equity mutual funds, we test the proposition that managers likely to end up as losers manipulate fund risk differently from interim winners. In contrast with Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996) who found robust support for the tournament model, we found no evidence of tournament like behavior for international and global mutual funds. A possible explanation of this behavior is that investors in these funds are primarily seeking diversification and therefore are less sensitive to relative performance.
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