Mutual Detectability: A Targeted SETI Strategy That Avoids the SETI Paradox

Abstract

Abstract As our ability to undertake searches for extraterrestrial intelligence (SETI) grows, so does interest in the controversial endeavor of messaging extraterrestrial intelligence (METI). METI proponents point to the SETI Paradox—if all civilizations refrain from METI then SETI is futile. I introduce mutual detectability as a game-theoretic strategy to increase the success potential of targeted SETI. Mutual detectability comprises four laws that establish how SETI participants can engage each other based on mutual evidence of mutual existence. I argue that the party whom both SETI participants can judge to have better quality evidence, or common denominator information (CDI), has an onus to transmit to avoid the SETI Paradox. Transiting exoplanets within the Earth Transit Zone form a target subset that satisfies mutual detectability requirements. I identify the intrinsic time-integrated transit signal strength, which for Earth is 103 L ⊙ ppm hours yr−1, as suitable CDI. Civilizations on habitable-zone planets of radius have superior CDI on us, and so under the mutual detectability framework have game-theory incentive (onus) to transmit. While the onus to transmit falls on us for habitable planets around L * > L ⊙ stars, considerations of relative stellar frequency, main-sequence lifetime and planet occurrence rates mean that such systems are likely to be in a small minority. Surveys of the Earth Transit Zone for Earth-analog transiting planets around subsolar luminosity hosts would facilitate targeted SETI programs for civilizations who have game-theory incentive to transmit signals to us. A choice to remain silent, by not engaging in METI toward such systems, does not in this case fuel concerns of a SETI Paradox.