Muʿtezile’nin Ahlâkî Realizmine Karşı Îcî’nin Argümanları

Abstract

Al-Ījī presents the final stage of Ashʿarism, and his arguments reflect the traditional and philosophical approaches in the school. This paper presents the main arguments that al-Ījī deployed to refute the Muʿtazilites’ ethical realism. Its aim is to present the exact form of al-Ījī’s arguments, explain them, discuss the objections, and then evaluate their strengths. The paper’s aim is to explain the Muʿtazilites’ arguments; nevertheless, it gives some clarifications when it is needed to understand al-Ījī’s arguments in a better way. In the beginning, the paper draws a distinct line between the Ashʿarites’ and the Muʿtazilite ethical understandings. It defines the focus of the controversy and prepares the groundwork for theological arguments. Al-Ījī’s arguments are divided into three categories. In the first one, we present al-Ījī’s general argument, which is a polemic argument whereby al-Ījī tries to negate the freedom of human choice in order to cast doubt on the Muʿtazilite ethical foundations. We discuss its critique, and then reveal al-Ījī’s real position on human power and freedom of choice. The second category contains three arguments against the intrinsic ethical value: two of the arguments were adopted by al-Ījī and the third was attributed to other Ashʿarites in a general way. The first two arguments deal with the intrinsic ethical values of lying and truth-telling, while the third one is based on the Ashʿarite famous assertion: ‘an accident cannot subsist on another accident.’ The final category is dedicated to discussing al-Ījī’s argument against the Muʿtazilite theory of ethical aspects. A sufficient account of the theory and its partisans is provided before discussing al-Ījī’s argument. Moreover, a brief introduction of Al-Ījī’s and the Muʿtazilites’ conception of divine ethics is discussed in the folds of the argument. Some divine qualities, such as justice and wisdom, are defined from the Ashʿarites’ and the Muʿtazilites’ perspectives. As a result, the paper gives a clear account of al-Ījī’s arguments against the Muʿtazilites’ ethical realism; it presents and evaluates the objections and defines the strengths and the defects in the arguments. Finally, it proposes a better way to understand the Ashʿarites’ ethical arguments in their right context.