Abstract

Abstract In this paper we show how a realistic normative democratic theory can work within the constraints set by the most pessimistic empirical results about voting behaviour and elite capture of the policy process. After setting out the empirical evidence and discussing some extant responses by political theorists, we argue that the evidence produces a two-pronged challenge for democracy: an epistemic challenge concerning the quality and focus of decision-making and an oligarchic challenge concerning power concentration. To address the challenges we then put forward three main normative claims, each of which is compatible with the evidence. We start with (1) a critique of the epistocratic position commonly thought to be supported by the evidence. We then introduce (2) a qualified critique of referenda and other forms of plebiscite, and (3) an outline of a tribune-based system of popular control over oligarchic influence on the policy process. Our discussion points towards a renewal of democracy in a plebeian but not plebiscitarian direction: Attention to the relative power of social classes matters more than formal dispersal of power through voting. We close with some methodological reflections about the compatibility between our normative claims and the realist program in political philosophy.

Highlights

  • Political scientists often accuse normative democratic theorists of theorizing in ways unrelated to ‘real democracies’

  • In this paper we show how a realistic normative democratic theory can work within the constraints set by the most pessimistic empirical results about voting behaviour and elite capture of the policy process

  • After setting out the empirical evidence and discussing some extant responses by political theorists, we argue that the evidence produces a two-pronged challenge for democracy: an epistemic challenge concerning the quality and focus of decision-making and an oligarchic challenge concerning power concentration

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Summary

Introduction

Political scientists often accuse normative democratic theorists of theorizing in ways unrelated to ‘real democracies’. The upshot is that successful efforts to reduce oligarchic influence in contemporary democracies will require democratic innovations that try to overcome some of the epistemic challenges discussed by authors like Achen and Bartels without falling into the camp of epistocratic elitism. This will require both closer attention to the empirical evidence and more aggressive institutional reforms than many political theorists have hitherto endorsed. Though, that by putting some of the relevant empirics front and centre and constructing our normative conclusions on their basis, we can begin to chart a new way of doing realist political theory

The Group Theory of Voting
Criticisms
Democracy or Oligarchy?
Two Realist Challenges
Against Epistocracy
Against Plebiscitarianism
Findings
A Methodological Conclusion
Full Text
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