Abstract
Frequency control is one of the critical systems responsible for maintaining grid stability, making it a vulnerable and attractive choice for cyber-attacks. This article presents a multivariate singular spectrum analysis (MSSA) for extracting the system’s dynamics under normal operation and proposes a projection-based distance tracking and hypothesis testing method to detect multiarea load frequency control (MA-LFC) attacks. The proposed methodology is robust, adaptive, and computationally efficient, especially, when system and measurement noises are considered. The three main features of the proposed method are that: 1) it uses standard SCADA data and does not require attack data; 2) it can be integrated with the existing grid control system with minimal hardware; and 3) it is independent of system configuration and upgrades. The attack detection algorithm can successfully detect different types of false data injection attacks (FDIAs), including stealth attacks on multiple sensors. The algorithm is tested on an IEEE 39-bus New England test system, 300 bus test system, and 1888 bus RTE system. The attack detection algorithm was found to be reliable, fast, robust, and scalable under noisy measurements compared to the existing methods.
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More From: IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics: Systems
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