Abstract
We consider stochastic replicator processes for games that are composed of finitely many trials. Several general results on the relation between Nash equilibria and the long-run behaviour of the stochastic processes are proved. In particular, a sufficient condition is given for almost sure convergence to a state where everyone plays in every trial a strict Nash equilibrium. The results are applied to multiple-trial conflicts based on wars of attrition and on sperm competition games with fair raffles, respectively.
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