Abstract
In an earlier article in this journal, Sefton and Yavas (1995) concluded that subsidizing a monopoly multiple listing service (MLS) can be efficient when the curvature of the representative consumer's demand function leads to overshifting. This paper extends their analysis to a multiple-consumer demand model. It shows that, for the generalized demand configuration considered here, in general, there is no Pareto superior MLS subsidy supportable by nondiscriminatory MLS consumer taxes when the Pareto ranking is imposed without the Hicks–Kaldor compensation principle.
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