Abstract

We propose an improved and extended approach of the multiple linear cryptanalysis presented by A. Biryukov et al. at CRYPTO 2004 that exploits dominant and statistically independent linear trails. While they presented only rank based attacks with success probability 1, we present threshold based attacks as well as rank based ones using newly introduced statistic that is a linear combination of the component statistics for the trails and is an approximation of the LLR statistic. The rank based Algorithm 1 style attack yields the same estimate for the gain with Biryukov et al.’s Algorithm 1 style attack. For each of the threshold based Algorithm 1 style and Algorithm 2 style attacks, we provide a formula for its advantage in terms of the correlations of the trails, the data complexity, and the success probability in case the aimed success probability is not 1. Combining the threshold based attacks with the rank based ones, we get attacks each of which has better estimates for the advantage compared to the threshold based one in case the aimed success probability is close to 1. We then extend the methods to get a new framework of multiple linear attacks exploiting close-to-dominant linear trails that may not be statistically independent. We apply the methods to full DES and get linear attacks using 4 linear trails with about the same or better complexity compared to those presented at ASIACRYPT 2017 that use 4 additional trails. With data complexity less than 241, the attack has better complexity than existing attacks on DES.

Highlights

  • Since first introduced by Matsui [Mat93], the linear attack has been regarded as one of the most important attacks against block ciphers

  • Since 2 is a constant and j τjI (D)2/N 2 is a constant for given data D, the rank of β with respect to their statistic is exactly the same as its rank with respect to ours. It seems that the existence of the added quadratic term j τjI (D)2/N 2 makes it hard to get a threshold based variant using their statistic

  • We use a small number of linear trails that are close-to-dominant so we think that our models do not contradict their observations

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Summary

Introduction

Since first introduced by Matsui [Mat93], the linear attack has been regarded as one of the most important attacks against block ciphers. Biryukov et al.[BCQ04] presented Algorithm 1 style and Algorithm 2 style attacks that use independent and dominant linear trails, not imposing such condition on the parity bits Their attack is based on a maximum likelihood approach and they provided a formula for the gain or advantage of the attack in terms of the sum of the squared correlations of the linear approximations and the data complexity. We introduce a new statistic that is a linear combination of the component statistics for the trails and apply it in three versions of Algorithm 1 style and Algorithm 2 style attacks It is an approximation of the LLR statistic and enables us to get an explicit formula for the estimate of the advantage for each attack in terms of the correlations of the trails, the data size and the success probability for each of the versions.

Terminology and Notations
Linear Trails and Linear Hulls
Statistic for Algorithm 1 Style Attack
Statistic for Algorithm 2 Style Attack
Linear attacks using a single approximation
Linear attacks using multiple approximations
Issues with linear attacks on full DES using multiple approximations
New Methods of Multiple Linear Cryptanalysis
Description of Algorithm 1 Style Attacks
Algorithm 1MT
Algorithm 1MC
False Alarm Probability
Description of Algorithm 2 Style Attacks
Algorithm 2MT
Algorithm 2MC
Algorithm 1 Style Attacks
Algorithm 2 Style Attacks
Geometric Description
Relation with the LLR statistic
Matsui’s Algorithms Revisited
Description
Success Probability
Matsui’s Algorithm 2
Success Probability and Advantage
Generalization
Prerequisites
Attacks Using Close-to-dominant and Independent Trails
Description of the Attack
Complexity of the Attacks
Experimental Verification
Discussion
The Validity of the Statistical Models
Experimental Verification with full DES
Necessity of Considering Wrong Key Types
The Coefficients in the Linear Statistic
Other Considerations
Conclusive Remarks
A Proof of Proposition 1
C An Auxiliary Lemma and Its Proof
D Separability of the LLR statistic for independent random variables
F The keys and data used in the experiments with DES

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