Multiple large shareholders and M&A quality: evidence from China

Abstract

ABSTRACT This study investigates the influence of the presence of multiple large shareholders (MLS) on the quality of mergers and acquisitions (M&A). Using data from the Chinese market, we find that the presence of MLS in acquiring firms is associated with a higher level of goodwill impairment in the three-year period following the completion of an M&A transaction, relative to firms devoid of such shareholder structures. The further analysis suggests that the identity of these shareholders is crucial; specifically, when the second-largest shareholder is identical to the controlling shareholder, the adverse effects on goodwill valuation are more significant. This relationship is mitigated when the identities of the controlling and the second-largest shareholders differ. The impact is particularly noticeable in transactions involving commitment performance contracts, related party transactions, and in sectors characterized by high goodwill valuations. This study contributes to the literature on the economic outcomes associated with MLS structures in China, a context marked by the prevalence of such ownership arrangements and limited minority shareholder protections.