Abstract
A concept of diversity is an understanding of what makes a group diverse that may be applicable in a variety of contexts. We distinguish three diversity concepts, show that each can be found in discussions of diversity in science, and explain how they tend to be associated with distinct epistemic and ethical rationales. Yet philosophical literature on diversity among scientists has given little attention to distinct concepts of diversity. This is significant because the unappreciated existence of multiple diversity concepts can generate unclarity about the meaning of “diversity,” lead to problematic inferences from empirical research, and obscure complex ethical-epistemic questions about how to define diversity in specific cases. We illustrate some ethical-epistemic implications of our proposal by reference to an example of deliberative mini-publics on human tissue biobanking.
Highlights
Philosophers and social scientists have explored ways in which diversity might lead to epistemically better science or improve group performance in a variety of settings
We explore some implications this idea with an example of deliberative minipublics used to inform science policy issues, wherein we suggest that ethicalepistemic concerns can result in the use of hybrid diversity concepts
This article has distinguished egalitarian, representative, and normic diversity concepts and explored their interconnections. The differences between these concepts matter, because they are often linked to separate explanations of why diversity is desirable from an ethical or epistemic perspective, and because variants of egalitarian, representative, and normic concepts are embedded in specific contexts related to diversity in science
Summary
Philosophers and social scientists have explored ways in which diversity might lead to epistemically better science or improve group performance in a variety of settings While the existence of multiple contexts of diversity is widely recognized, philosophical discussions of how diversity might enhance science have devoted little attention to concepts of diversity in our sense This situation is problematic for several reasons. 1957; cf Fehr and Plaisance 2010) We suggest that such a phenomenon is present in explanations, proposed by philosophers and social scientists of various stripes, of how diversity can enhance the cognitive performance of groups. These explanations sometimes presuppose distinct conceptions of diversity that are associated with differing ethical and epistemic reasons for why diversity should be valued.
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