Multiple Audit Mechanism and Audit Quality: Some Preliminary Evidence

Abstract

Purpose: This study focuses on the distinctive Egyptian setting, where firms could use multiple audit mechanism voluntarily or mandatory under certain circumstances. We investigate the effects on audit quality and cost of debt. Design/methodology/approach: A sample of 1699 firm-year observations of Egyptian listed firms for the 2009-2019 period is used. Abnormal accruals are employed as proxies of audit quality through abnormal working capital accruals and modified-Jones models. The multiple regression method is used to estimate the research model after controlling for firm and ownership specific factors that hypothetically influence the levels of both audit quality and cost of debt. Findings: Results suggest that joint audits are not associated with both proxies of audit quality. In contrast, the dual audit is positively associated with abnormal accruals leading to conclude that dual audits are not providing a high level of audit quality. But this result holds only in companies with income decreasing discretionary accruals. These results are in line with litigation and reputational risk fears offering motivations for auditors to favour conservative accounting alternatives (i.e., income decreasing discretionary accruals). This implies that firms opting to employ dual audits have a higher level of earnings conservatism. Our evidence also indicates that the choice of multiple audit mechanisms especially joint audits is related to significant increases in the cost of debt, implying a higher perceived level of risk. Further, dual audits decrease the cost of debt only in companies with high earnings management. Originality/value: This study adds to the literature on whether the preference of income-increasing or income decreasing discretionary accruals is related to multiple audit mechanism and consequently affected cost of debt. Together, our results support the view that voluntary joint audits are not related to audit quality in Egypt compared to mandatory dual audits, which consequently affect the pricing of debt. Our results have important implications for policymakers, audit firms and investors. .