Abstract
We formalize the adversarial process between defender and attackers as a game and study the non-cooperative evolutionary game mechanism under bounded rationality. We analyze the long-term dynamic process between the attacking and defending parties using the evolutionary stable strategies derived from the evolutionary game model. First, we construct a multi-player evolutionary game model consisting of a defender and multiple attackers, formally describe the strategies, and construct a three-player game payoff matrix. Then, we propose two punishment schemes, i.e., static and dynamic ones. Moreover, through the combination of mathematical derivation with simulation, we obtain the evolutionary stable strategies of each player. Different from previous work, in this paper, we consider the influence of strategies among different attackers. The simulation shows that (1) in the static punishment scheme, increasing the penalty can quickly control the occurrence of network attacks in the short term; (2) in the dynamic punishment scheme, the game can be stabilized effectively, and the stable state and equilibrium values are not affected by the change of the initial values.
Highlights
As computer and network technologies develop, the informationization of society continues to expand rapidly
In order to stabilize and control the network security situation and to reduce the occurrence of network security attacks, organizations can organically combine the static punishment scheme and the dynamic punishment scheme according to the main objectives in different periods when choosing strategies and when formulating laws and regulations—reducing the probability of attackers attacking while avoiding the fluctuations that already exist in the game in order to stably control the network security situation
We built a network attack model based on a multi-player evolutionary game model
Summary
As computer and network technologies develop, the informationization of society continues to expand rapidly. SD is ioral choices and payoff of the parties in the process based on evolutionary game theory successfully used in many strategies and decision analyses [11,12] and is a modeling according to the network attack and defense scenarios in enterprises and the strength of approach that is suitable for dealing with long-term and periodic problems. We simulate each player’s strategy the evolutionary game system dynamics model for network attack and defense, this changes and interaction effects using system dynamics (SD) [10], which are widely used paper studies the problems that organizations face when governing network security from in numerical simulations, and study the implementation effects of each strategy and the both qualitative and quantitative aspects. The conclusion is described in Section studies the problems that organizations face when governing network security from both
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