Multi-period modeling of two-way price commitment under price-dependent demand

Abstract

This paper examines the use of price-commitment policies in dynamic contracting in multiple-period, finite-time horizons. Two specific forms of price commitment are considered: one on the part of the retailer through a retail-fixed-markup contract and one on the part of the manufacturer through a price-protection contract. Optimal policies for each form of price commitment are analytically derived, as are optimal policies for the traditional price-only and centralized supply chain scenarios that we use as comparisons. We prove that optimal retail price and order size solutions exist in each period under the assumption of non-increasing price-dependent demand. We show that the existence of retailer inventory between periods causes the optimal policies to differ from a static single-period model. Further, we show that a supplier offers a price-protection policy as a signal to the retailer to resolve the gaming that naturally occurs under price-only; this effectively decouples the multi-period dynamic contracting setting into repeated single-period scenarios. However, the resulting behavior can actually inhibit supply chain performance. On the retail commitment side, we find that retail-fixed-markup policies are quite effective in improving supply chain efficiency. We show that such policies can lead to Pareto-improvement over price-only contracts and can even coordinate the supply chain in some situations.