Abstract
In order to reply to the contemporary skeptic’s argument for the conclusion that we don’t have any empirical knowledge about the external world, several authors have suggested different fallibilist theories of knowledge that reject the epistemic closure principle. Holliday [8], however, shows that almost all of them suffer from either the problem of containment or the problem of vacuous knowledge. Furthermore, Holliday [9] suggests that the fallibilist should allow a proposition to have multiple sets of relevant alternatives, each of which is sufficient while none is necessary, if all its members are eliminated, for knowing that proposition. Not completely satisfied with Holliday’s multi-path reply to the skeptic, the author suggests a new single-path relevant alternative theory of knowledge and argues that it can avoid both the problem of containment and the problem of vacuous knowledge while rejecting skepticism.
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