Multinational Enterprises: Their Private and Social Benefits and Costs

Abstract

Government policy‐makers in many countries compete to attract FDI because they believe that FDI will generate knowledge spillovers in the local economy. However, there is surprising little empirical evidence in favour of substantial spillovers. This raises the question of what benefits can be appropriated by host countries when spillovers are small. This paper analyses the issue using a simple model of the global strategy of a profit‐maximising MNE. It is based on a partial equilibrium model of the firm; although less sophisticated than the general equilibrium approach, it provides a sharper focus on fundamental policy issues. It shows that the principal social benefit conferred by an MNE is measured by the profit its subsidiary generates. This reflects the fact that, according to standard theory, the MNE is an institutional arrangement for appropriating rents from innovation. Other rents may also accrue to local factors of production. The model is used to appraise a range of alternative policy instruments for maximising national benefit from FDI.