Abstract
Cross-border banking presents a unique set of challenges in the EU from the perspective of arranging administrative oversight structures. Structuring cooperation between different EU and national authorities in a way which is conducive to trust-building and mutual engagement is an essential condition for overcoming disintegrative tendencies in the internal market. To assess how the existing EU arrangements fare in this regard in the context of EU resolution law, this article comparatively analyses the different models of multilevel administrative cooperation in the post-crisis EU framework. These are specifically the centralised model of the European Banking Union (Single Resolution Mechanism) and the relatively looser networked model of the resolution colleges. The multilevel cooperation under both models is nuanced given the distinct roles of the national resolution authorities, EU agencies and the differentiated status of non-euro area Member States in the EBU (Croatia, Bulgaria). The article’s findings allow to identify specific problems of constitutional nature pertaining to the accountability of administrative cooperation, equality of Member States and the implications of Meroni doctrine’s distortive effects.
Highlights
In the light of the preceding analysis, are there specific aspects of the individual multilevel cooperation arrangements which explain their relative successes or shortcomings in terms of creating a framework within which effective cross-border resolution is possible without market fragmentation? In other words, can we identify specific features of multilevel administrative cooperation which are more conducive to constructive engagement and trustbuilding among the authorities involved, where these are necessary condition for a successful cross-border resolution? This section discusses some explanations
This article has analysed comparatively the multilevel administrative cooperation established for bank crisis prevention and management in the European Union (EU) and the European Banking Union (EBU)
It has grappled with the complexity of the resolution colleges and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) in order to explain why it appears that looser arrangements may well be more conducive to cooperative outcomes than centralised ones, or at least no less effective in making for cooperative cross-border resolution outcomes
Summary
Structuring of administrative cooperation in a way which is conducive to trust-building and mutual engagement is an essential condition for overcoming disintegrative tendencies. This article analyses the different models of national and EU public authority cooperation in EU resolution law It further assesses their relative suitability to achieve their goals in relation to the objectives of relevant EU law and discusses the constitutional conundrums which arise. Remedying a pre-crisis lacuna, the 2014 Bank Resolution and Recovery Directive (BRRD) [24], which applies to all EU Member States, created a new form of cross-border cooperation, namely resolution colleges. These integrated administrative structures are charged with implementation of BRRD rules and tasks related to ex ante bank crisis prevention and management of crises with regard to individual cross-border bank groups. As a first step in the analysis, I review the objectives, means and outcomes of BRRD and SRM in the cross-border context
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
