Abstract

A Southeast Asian Perspective Economically, Southeast Asia is coming of age. ASEAN countries wish to map their own futures without significant outside interference. Despite having neither a charter nor economic clout, ASEAN members have managed to maintain regional peace and security. However, these five apprehensions do exist: * The Taiwan/China dispute * Conventional arms proliferation * The fragile Cambodian peace * The Spratly Islands and Chinese claims in the South China Sea * The division of Korea ASEAN countries are skeptical of using conflict resolution models such as OSCE, EC, and WEU from other areas of the world to reduce these apprehensions among nations whose cultures differ from those of Europe. They are more likely to rely upon ARF even though it is in its nascent, untested stage a breakthrough for ASEAN countries towards multilateral approaches to resolving disputes and addressing security matters. The general Southeast Asian perspectives on the United States, China, Russia and Japan follow. * The United States should continue safeguarding the regional balance of power and ensuring open trade. Because of China's growing military and economic power, ASEAN prefers that the United States remain engaged as a counterbalance to China. The United States will most likely continue as the number one outsider to ASEAN for trade and military power. * China is not seen as a threat. There are concerns about China's recent actions in the Spratly Islands, which could help motivate a dialogue with the Chinese and develop stronger security institutions in the region. Southeast Asian nations appreciate the enormous challenge China faces as masses of its citizens migrate from rural areas to the cities and the economy struggles to create 270 million jobs in the next 10 years just to sustain the employment rate at its current level. * Russia is viewed as a declining threat and a waning force in the region. Russia's absence as a player in Southeast Asia has had a profound impact on the regional security environment. Relationships built during the Cold War period are currently being restructured due to the absence of Soviet influence in the region. * Japan is seen as a benign military power, unable to counter China. Japan is expected to assume a more assertive economic role and continue in a passive politico-military role. Views from Other Nations The Australians view themselves as an integral part of Southeast Asia, which accounts for 14% of their trade. Given the probability of increasing investments and trade in the region, Australia's strategy is to maintain current alliances with major powers and enhance multilateral actions with ASEAN countries through the Five Power Defense Arrangements, APEC and ARF. China expects intensified competition in the region. Its main interests are for Asian nations to focus on economic development quickly, and for China to be recognized as a great Asian power to be treated with respect and deference. India's long experiment with self-sufficient socialism and its friendly relationship with the Soviet Union have isolated it from the region. India's interests in Southeast Asia include becoming trading partners with Southeast Asian countries and ensuring a balanced regional power structure. Reflecting these interests, India has five major concerns: * the upgrading of Southeast Asian military forces due to modernization; * the danger that ASEAN expects too much from multilateralism; * the possible violent disruption of the region Islamic fundamentalism could cause; * the impact on the balance of power from the relationship between cash-rich/technology poor China and cash-poor/technology-rich Russia; * the safe downsizing of the ICBMs left from the Cold War. Japan does not see troubled or failed states, or state-to-state conflicts as major issues in Southeast Asia, but regards sovereignty of each state as the most important factor. …

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