Abstract
Incentive-compatibility conditions are characterized in general for problems in which several goods are to be allocated and agents' types are multidimensional. Two questions of monopoly pricing under multidimensional uncertainty are then analyzed. First, we find the optimal nonlinear pricing scheme when the monopolist knows only the distribution of an arbitrarily parameterized family of demand curves, and second, we solve for the optimal bundling policy for a multiproduct monopolist.
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