Abstract
We analyse a cheap-talk game where contrasting lobbies are asymmetrically informed. Equilibrium information transmission depends on each lobby´s preference alignment with the legislator on the dimension of its expertise, and on the conflict of lobby interests. Full revelation is possible only when each lobby´s preference on its expertise is completely aligned with the legislator´s. Otherwise, greater preference alignment and lowered lobbyist conflict induce more transmission. We also show that results are sensitive to the legislator´s expertise. In turn, we demonstrate how informational impacts provide predictions about when legislators will delegate to an expert, and we note our analyses´ broader empirical implications.
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