Multiattribute-Based Double Auction Toward Resource Allocation in Vehicular Fog Computing

Abstract

Vehicular fog computing (VFC) could provide fast task processing services for vehicles. To make vehicles/fog nodes willing to buy/sell resources, a double auction mechanism considering the interests of all parties is needed. However, few works study the auction issue in VFC. Different from the existing edge-related auction which only considers the price, some nonprice attributes (location, reputation, and computing power) are also important for providing fair resource allocation in VFC. In this article, we propose a multiattribute-based double auction mechanism in VFC, which considers both the price and nonprice attributes for constructing reasonable matching. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work to consider multiattribute-based auction in VFC. Our auction mechanism could satisfy computational efficiency, individual rationality, budget balance, and truthfulness. To verify the proposed mechanism, we simulate VFC using VISSIM and extract the driving data. The experimental results show the effectiveness and efficiency of this mechanism.