Abstract

In practical multi-attribute procurement auctions, the profit and winning a contract have different importance to the suppliers. This paper assumes that the suppliers weight the profit and probability of winning a contract with Cobb-Douglas utility function, obtains the suppliers' equilibrium bidding strategies and the buyer' expected utilities in the first- and second-score auctions, and compares them with those under risk-neutral.

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