Abstract
We study the equilibrium for symmetric competition between multi-sided platforms under utility competition and make equilibrium comparison for asymmetric platform competition. We consider the small-ticket effect where the price cap regulation of the large-ticket item leads to a rise of the price for the small-ticket item. We show that competitive price discrimination could lead to higher profits for firms. We build a model with general externality and demand function. We consider a partially covered market and show that the externality could be a bless for firms. Moreover, we conduct a merger analysis for the general demand and externality model.
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