Abstract
Suppose a multi-national agency can set minimum standards for the postal USO that apply to the countries under its jurisdiction, and that each country is required to comply with, or exceed, these standards. We examine the trade-offs that ensue across countries in designing an efficient USO at the multi-national level when these postal markets are also simultaneously opened to competitive entry. In particular, the paper examines when "subsidiarty dominates" (in which case the multinational regulator should leave the determination of the USO entirely in the hands of national regulators) and when some intervention by the multi-national regulator is desirable.
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