Multi-message multi-receiver signcryption scheme based on blockchain.

Abstract

In conventional message communication systems, the practice of multi-message multi-receiver signcryption communication encounters several challenges, including the vulnerability to Key Generation Center (KGC) attacks, privacy breaches and excessive communication data volume. The KGC necessitates a secure channel to transmit partial private keys, thereby rendering the security of these partial private keys reliant on the integrity of the interaction channel. This dependence introduces concerns regarding the confidentiality of the private keys. Our proposal advocates for the substitution of the KGC in traditional certificateless schemes with blockchain and smart contract technology. Parameters are publicly disclosed on the blockchain, leveraging its tamper-proof property to ensure security. Furthermore, this scheme introduces conventional encryption techniques to achieve user identity privacy in the absence of a secure channel, effectively resolving the issue of user identity disclosure inherent in blockchain-based schemes and enhancing communication privacy. Moreover, users utilize smart contract algorithms to generate a portion of the encrypted private key, thereby minimizing the possibility of third-party attacks. In this paper, the scheme exhibits resilience against various attacks, including KGC leakage attacks, internal privilege attacks, replay attacks, distributed denial of service attacks and Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attacks. Additionally, it possesses desirable security attributes such as key escrow security and non-repudiation. The proposed scheme has been theoretically and experimentally analyzed under the random oracle model, based on the computational Diffie-Hellman problem and the discrete logarithm problem. It has been proven to possess confidentiality and unforgeability. Compared with similar schemes, our scheme has lower computational cost and shorter ciphertext length. It has obvious advantages in communication and time overhead.